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ABSTRACT 
This essay sets out to reconstruct the main characteristics and 
performances of the notion of Weltbild in Max Weber. The underlying 
idea is that world image is the principal place for deciphering the profile 
of subjectivity in a particular age and the decisive factor for 
understanding the subject’s physiognomy. The essay is divided into 
three parts. The first (§§ 1-2) reconstructs the Weberian notion of 
world image. The second (§ 3) deals with the relationship between 
materiality and world images. The third (§ 4) reconstructs Weber’s 
world image as it emerges from Politics as a Vocation, highlighting how 
this world image provides the background from which Weber draws 
lines of argument for his normative proposal on the relationship 
between ethics and politics. 
Introduction 
This essay sets out to reconstruct some characteristics, performances and sys-
tematic values of the notion of world image [Weltbild] in Max Weber. The un-
derlying idea is that world image is the decisive dimension for understanding 
the physiognomy of subjectivity in a particular age. The world image defines 
individuals’ attitude towards the world in that it delimits their possible per-
formances and makes it more or less possible that a particular type of practical 
conduct will be produced and/or spread. In short, the world image is the prin-
cipal place for deciphering the profile of subjectivity in a particular age and the 
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decisive factor for understanding the subject’s physiognomy, resources, as well 
as what he/she can and also cannot do. 
The main systematic value of the notion of world image in Weber’s theory is 
that it allows anthropology to be radically neutralised. Man’s position in the 
world is not an anthropological given, but the product of a world image. Weber 
was the first author to have more coherently stressed the extraordinary variety 
and changeability of man’s attitude towards the world and his dependence on 
images. What is important for man’s relationship with the world is not human 
nature, but something less ultimate and inaccessible: the concrete physiog-
nomy of the image, or rather images, of the world. Hence, human subjectivity’s 
position with regard to the world is a contingent given. It is not determined by 
anthropology. The anthropological presupposition consists exclusively of the 
fact that man’s relationship with the world is always mediated by images, by 
subjective depictions whose validity lies simply in the fact that they are be-
lieved. 
This paper is divided into three parts. The first (§§ 1-2) reconstructs the 
notion of world image by analysing the only context in which Weber explicitly 
thematises this topic. The second (§ 3) deals with the relationship between 
materiality and world images. The third (§ 4) reconstructs Weber’s world im-
age as it emerges from Politics as a Vocation. At the same time this part seeks 
to highlight how this world image provides the background from which Weber 
draws lines of argument for his normative proposal on the relationship between 
ethics and politics, and, simultaneously, and more radically, determines the 
efficacy of his proposal.  
1. The World in Images 
As regards the concept of world image, it has been noted how little considera-
tion is given to this concept in critical literature and how, in any case, it is ana-
lysed exclusively within the specific context of the consequences of world relig-
ions on practical conduct and in particular on the economic ethos of the fol-
lowers of the great world religions. With the exception of the work by Kalberg 
2004 — whose view diverges significantly from the perspective put forward 
here — the few essays that have set value by the role of this notion have done so 
with a view to reconstructing Weber’s sociology of religion. There have been 
no investigations from a more global perspective of a theory of society and poli-
tics, despite the background presence of this concept in the reflection Weber 
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devoted more explicitly to diagnosing his own era, namely Politics as a Voca-
tion. 
While it underlies the vast amount of work produced by Weber on the sub-
ject of the sociology of religion, the topic becomes explicit in an extremely fa-
mous passage from the Introduction to the Economic Ethics of the World Re-
ligions:  
The conception of the idea of redemption, as such, is very old, if one 
understands by it a liberation from distress, hunger, drought, sickness, and 
ultimately from suffering and death. Yet redemption attained a specific 
significance only where it expressed a systematic and rationalized ―image of the 
world‖ and represented a stand in the face of the world. For the meaning as well 
as the intended and actual psychological quality of redemption has depended 
upon such a world image and such a stand. […] ―From what‖ and ―for what‖ 
one wished to be redeemed and, let us not forget, ―could be‖ redeemed, 
depended upon one’s image of the world. (Weber, 1974c, p. 280, italics mine)  
Albeit in the specific context of describing the religious image of the world — 
or rather, describing the world image of the religiosity of redemption — here 
Weber focuses on some aspects that are typical to every world image. First, the 
world image gives an interpretation of our condition: it selects the (material 
and ideal) elements that we deem intolerable and defines or focuses on the 
goods that we intend to pursue. In other words, it defines the core of what we 
are interested in and the fundamental object of our care and concern. It is only 
within the framework of a particular world image that needs, passions and re-
quirements receive a definition.  
In the definition of what we wish to be redeemed ―from‖ and ―for‖, an abso-
lutely decisive role is played by the second performance typical of every world 
image: the definition of the horizon of what is possible. Defining the possible 
does not simply overlap with a certain interpretation of our condition, but, to a 
large extent, actually constitutes it. The need for redemption, for liberation 
from something (whether it be ideal or material) is also and above all condi-
tioned by the perception of a possibility of redemption. We wish to be re-
deemed from something because redemption from that something is possible 
on the basis of a certain world image: only if that specific redemption is consid-
ered possible. Hope and desperation do not come into play in interests and 
needs that are already defined, but they are the fundamental link pin in order to 
define them. A generic state of suffering, deprivation and the presence of social 
strata that are oppressed or thought of negatively, are not enough to ―produce‖ 
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or ―arouse‖ the need for redemption. There is no perception of material or 
symbolic deprivation that disregards an interpretation of the world (i.e. a world 
image), but above all no suffering or deprivation produces the will for redemp-
tion or ethic-religious mobilisation without an interpretation of the world that 
makes a possibility of redemption credible (Weber, 1974c, p. 267). 
Third, the world image is the decisive element in order to define the tools 
needed to obtain our goals, whether they be liberation from suffering or 
achieving a condition of salvation. For example, the individual or collective, 
peaceful or violent nature of the means that are indispensable to achieve each 
goal we pursue depends on the world image. In the same way so do the forms of 
self-governance and discipline of the passions connected to these goals. Lastly, 
defining the means and procedures for satisfying the requirements promoted 
by each world image in turn produces secondary material and ideal interests, 
directly connected to the specific ways of obtaining the primary goals.  
World images are not ―simple‖ ideas, metaphorical intuitions essentially 
consisting of a compact core of intuition that cannot be broken down. If any-
thing, ideas are the initial core that is then developed and used in the world 
images: «[...] Yet very frequently the ―world images‖ that have been created by 
―ideas‖ have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has 
been pushed by the dynamics of interest» ( Weber, 1974c, p. 280). Therefore, 
for Weber, world images are essentially conceptual, rational and systematic 
constructions, which take shape thanks to intellectual strata who process ideas 
and intuitions generated by charismatic types of forces. Intellectuals are the 
main actors in building world images. They are not always, indeed hardly ever, 
their creators. Weber’s world images are complex and sophisticated constructs 
in which small differences can lead to profoundly different practical and also 
political attitudes. In terms of world images, the distance between Luther and 
Calvin, or between the Baptist movement annihilated at Münster and the 
Quakers of New England, is by no means a chasm, while the differences in their 
attitudes towards the world, and to political violence in particular, are ex-
tremely significant. On the other hand, even a radical pluralism of Weltbilder 
does not dent their capacity to structure individual attitudes towards the world 
in the slightest. 
The world image does not necessarily correspond to the belief in an objec-
tive ethical sense of the world. The latter characterizes all religious Weltbilder, 
but does not belong to them alone. As we will see, secular world images also 
exist that attribute an objective sense to the world and its future. Nevertheless, 
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the world as a meaningless infinity is no less a world image than a meaningful 
world is. The image of a world lacking an objective meaning has exactly the 
same kind of impact – though in many ways the contents are the opposite – on 
the forms of moral experience, on the type of expectations and on the percep-
tion of temporality as the impact of world images that insist on the existence of 
an objective meaning. 
Finally, to speak of world images is to neutralize any claim of truth with re-
lation to the way one conceives of the world. Contrary to the notion of ideology 
as false consciousness, the notion of an image does not refer to the idea of a 
true/authentic depiction of the world. Access to the world is always and only 
through images because we cannot give an answer to the question of ―what is 
the world?‖ that we can claim to be true. The question relating to the world as 
an ideal totality of phenomena is at the same time misplaced in theory, unde-
cidable in science and unavoidable from a pragmatical point of view. For We-
ber a world image conditioned and influenced by modern science is no truer 
than the world image of religions in general or that of Christian monotheism. 
For Weber, the world image’s capacity to orient practical conduct and model 
subjectivity is nevertheless separate from its value of truth. Modern science 
does not demonstrate atheism. The world is a metaphysical entity. It can be 
given a particular shape only through an image, which results from an interpre-
tation that can be said neither to be true nor false, which is effective insofar as it 
is believed and not because it is authentic. 
Therefore, in Weber, the world image is a single and systematic intellectual 
construct (lacking in significant gaps). Not necessarily coherent, it interprets 
the world as a constitutively indeterminate totality of phenomena for essentially 
practical ends. The world image is a world in images: a product of human arti-
fice that makes a selection, a summary (an order) and integrates — real and pos-
sible — experience. This provides the framework of reference in order to inter-
pret our conditions and define our requirements and expectations. Here the 
image is not imitation, a reproduction, or a likeness. Instead, it is something 
projective, something that is necessarily creative, that is put forward as a single 
way of relating with something that cannot be grasped but that has to be re-
ferred to. The image is (the only) way of determining (which is indispensable 
from a practical viewpoint) something that by its constitution is undetermined, 
and is objectively inaccessible. Weber’s world image is a conceptual image that 
is the result of human work. It makes the unmanageable manageable, because 
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it rids the world of its excess of complexity, its surplus of experience. The 
world can either be given in an image, or not given at all.  
The fundamental variables of the way in which individuals behave towards 
the world — from adaptation to extraneousness, from indifference to rejection, 
from escape to domination — do not refer to human nature, but to the image 
that individuals, groups and civilisations form of the world.  
2. Indifference towards the Origin: Neutralising the Imagination 
The most singular feature of Weber’s approach to the topic of world images is 
shown in the two moves that he uses to deal with the issue of the origin and 
diffusion of a Weltbild: in that he forgoes formulating a theory on the role of 
the different faculties — in first place the imagination — in creating a world im-
age and, I would say in a specular manner, in that he emphasises the material 
conditioning that decides the success of a world image. 
One of the most striking aspects of Weber’s recognition of ancient Jewish 
prophetism — one of the crucial phenomena for the genesis of the Western 
Christian Weltbild — is his lack of reference to the imagination as the faculty 
directly or indirectly involved in creating new world images. The few refer-
ences to the prophets’ fantasy [Phantasie] are essentially used to describe the 
aural rather than visual nature of Jewish prophetism (Weber, 1952, p. 312). 
Nevertheless, in this case, the centrality of hearing is more an effect of the 
world image than an indication regarding its productive strength: Weber’s rea-
soning does not aim to single out the mental faculties involved in creating a 
Weltbild, but to underline how the image of the world and of God typical of 
ancient Judaism selects the emotional states recognised as charismatically pro-
phetic. 
The reasons for this lack of interest lie, first of all, in his emphasis of the in-
tellectual nature of world images. It is precisely owing to their nature as con-
structions of the intellect, their physiognomy and, above all, their concrete 
impact on conduct in life that these images essentially depend on the work of 
intellectual strata who do not correspond to those who provided the original 
core of ideas. The capacity of a particular Weltbild to orientate, its effective 
capacity to direct practical action is not linked to the original core connected to 
the charismatic personality, but to the intellectual strata’s global work of ar-
rangement and elaboration. It is only once it has been crystallised in a world 
image that the idea produces its effects. It is only after the idea has been elabo-
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rated and harnessed in a complex and composite intellectual construction that 
the practical effects of a world image can unfold. In producing world images, 
the constructive – intellectual/conceptual – element clearly predominates over 
the simple ideational moment in terms of understanding the practical effects of 
Weltbilder.  
But the totally decisive point is that Weber does not direct his interest at 
the moment that one could say gives rise to the creation of a world image, since 
what essentially grasps his attention is the question of which elements deter-
mine its success. It is here that Weber’s perspective takes on its most typical 
appearance, when he introduces the notion that the success of a world image 
depends on its capacity to give plausible responses to the threats that a society 
perceives as decisive. It is here that the conceptual tool proposed by Weber to 
read subjectivity, its possibilities and limits, meets the material analysis of soci-
ety and the reconstruction of the actors’ physiognomy as the conditions for 
understanding the success or failure of a particular Weltbild. 
3. The Material Conditioning and Autonomy of World Images 
The whole of Weber’s sociology of religion project could be summed up as the 
attempt to render account of a dual process of influence or conditioning: on 
one hand, he tries to grasp the effects of different world images on individual 
conduct and — through these effects — on the economic, social and political 
arrangements of a human group; on the other hand, he attempts to explain the 
success or failure of a particular Weltbild — or of some specific variant of it – as 
a result of the (broadly speaking) material conditions of social life, of its hierar-
chies, and of the physiognomy of its main actors. 
The crucial point is that the relationship between Weltbilder and the mate-
rial dimension does not give a general theory, nor a philosophy, nor provides a 
total reconstruction that can be called a determinism. The whole reflection on 
world religions is an attempt to develop a theory of world images, while think-
ing of both their material conditioning and autonomy at the same time. We-
ber’s reconstruction of the influence of the materiality of social life on world 
images indeed contemporaneously excludes any determinism that makes the 
latter a mere reflection of the material dimension. If what it is legitimate to ex-
pect individuals to do depends on the combination of their material condition 
and their world image, their world image does not appear determined neither 
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by their material condition, nor by the material conditions of the whole human 
group that they belong to. 
The nature of the relationships between the material dimension and world 
images is thematised by Weber in the Introduction to the Economic Ethics of 
the World Religions in a polemical comparison with two positions that are in 
reality very distant: on one hand historical materialism and on the other 
Nietzsche’s theory of resentment. What these two perspectives nevertheless 
have in common is a deterministic connection between an interest-situation 
and the religious ethics of a specific Weltbild:  
In various ways people have sought to interpret the connection between 
religious ethics and interest-situations in such a way that the former appear as 
mere ―functions‖ of the latter. Such interpretations occur in so-called historical 
materialism — which we shall not here discuss — as well as in a purely 
psychological sense. A quite general and abstract class-determination of 
religious ethics might be deduced from the theory of ―resentment‖, known 
since Friedrich Nietzsche’s brilliant essay and since then spiritedly treated by 
psychologists. (Weber, 1974c, p. 270).  
The thesis that there is a deterministic tie between material condition and 
world image is what the two theories have in common, and what Weber had 
rejected just a few lines earlier with an explicit reference to historical material-
ism:  
It is not our thesis that the specific nature of a religion is a simple ―function‖ of 
the social situation of the stratum which appears as its characteristic bearer, or 
that it represents the stratum’s ―ideology‖, or that it is a ―reflection‖ of a 
stratum’s material or ideal interest-situation. On the contrary, a more basic 
misunderstanding of the standpoint of these discussions would hardly be 
possible. (Weber, 1974c, pp. 269–270).  
While the materialistic conception of history and Nietzsche’s theory of resent-
ment may both deterministically reduce Weltbilder to the material dimension, 
nevertheless they possess a very different idea of the materiality upon which the 
images are made to depend. In addition to establishing a binding tie between 
materiality and world images, historical materialism and the theory of resent-
ment appear marked by a specular defect with relation to the way in which they 
conceive the materiality that Weltbilder are supposed to derive from: while 
materialism reduces materiality to the economy, the theory of resentment pro-
poses a barely determined idea of materiality whose definition ends up being 
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the alternative of whether the social group that one belongs to is favoured or 
not. This is the reason why the critique of the theory of resentment moves on a 
dual level: the explicit level which disputes the thesis of resentment as the 
common ethical-religious source that judges suffering as positive – and the 
world image that upholds it – and a more implicit level linked to the defining 
the dimensions of materiality that are significant in the establishment of a par-
ticular Weltbild. 
As far as the first level is concerned, Weber’s lines of argument can be 
boiled down to two observations. Weber puts forward the first not in the Intro-
duction to the Economic Ethics of the World Religions, but again in explicit 
reference to Nietzsche’s position, in the paragraph of the Religiöse Gemein-
schaften dedicated to The Religion of Non-Privileged Strata:  
The limited significance of the factor of ressentiment, and the dubiousness of 
applying the conceptual schema of ―repression‖ almost universally, appear 
most clearly when Nietzsche mistakenly applies his scheme to the altogether 
inappropriate example of Buddhism. (Weber, 1978, p. 499) 
In reality, it is precisely Buddhism, according to Weber, that belies Nietzsche’s 
theory since it is «the salvation doctrine of an intellectual stratum, originally 
recruited almost entirely from the privileged castes, especially the warrior 
caste, which proudly and aristocratically rejected the illusions of life, both here 
and hereafter» (Weber, 1978, p. 499). Buddhism shows how the origin of the 
religiosity of redemption is not to be sought in the social situation of the disad-
vantaged social strata, but in an intellectual need that can also be harboured in 
the privileged social strata.  
In the Introduction to the Economic Ethics of the World Religions Weber 
instead follows another path. Here his critique of Nietzsche’s line follows an 
argument that takes the emphasis on duty, typical of the religiosity of redemp-
tion of the unprivileged strata, away from the root of resentment:  
The sense of dignity of socially repressed strata or of strata whose status is 
negatively […] valued is nourished most easily on the belief that a special  
―mission‖ is entrusted to them; their worth is guaranteed or constituted by an 
ethical imperative, or by their own functional achievement. […] One source of 
the ideal power of ethical prophecies among socially disadvantaged strata lies in 
this fact. Resentment has not been required as a leverage; the rational interest 
in material and ideal compensation as such has been perfectly sufficient. 
(Weber, 1974c, pp. 276–277) 
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But it is at the second level that Weber’s critique of Nietzsche allows us to fo-
cus on what his idea of materiality is. In fact, at the conclusion of his critical 
assessment of the resentment thesis Weber hisses: «The specific nature of the 
great religious and ethical systems has been determined by social conditions of 
a far more particular nature than by mere contrast of ruling and ruled strata» 
(Weber, 1974c, p. 277). The materiality that needs to be called upon in order 
to understand the conditioning exercised on world images cannot have the 
closed confines of economic interest, nor the coarse-grain alternative between 
the privileged and the unprivileged.  
We can identify at least four distinct dimensions of materiality that have 
conditioned religious Weltbilder, and influenced decisive aspects of them. The 
first consists of geographical and climatic/natural conditions: the importance 
of rain for crops and the necessity — of course depending on geographical and 
climatic factors — of regulating water — building dams and canals for protection 
against flooding and internal navigation — for example, were not only a funda-
mental factor in building a central power and patrimonial bureaucracy in 
China, but also had significant consequences on the world image and divinity 
of Confucianism (Weber, 1968, pp. 21ff). The second dimension consists of 
the international political context and the role of the phenomenon and the ex-
perience of war in the perception of collective destinies. In China, 
[t]he unification of the empire, which proceeded with only minor interruptions 
from the third century BC onward represented the internal pacification of the 
empire, at least in principle. No longer was there the legitimate opportunity for 
internal warfare. The defense against and the subjection of the barbarians 
became simply a governmental police duty. Thus, in China, the God of Heaven 
could not assume the form of a hero-God who revealed himself in the irrational 
destiny of his people through its foreign relations, or who was worshipped in 
war, victory, defeat, exile and nostalgia[,]  
in the same way as the god of ancient Israel (Weber, 1968, p. 26). 
While the third dimension of materiality significant for defining a world im-
age is the one more directly linked to economic interests, it is on the fourth and 
last dimension that Weber dwells at length on several occasions:  
The chivalrous warrior class, peasants, business classes, and intellectuals with 
literary education have naturally pursued different religious tendencies [with 
regard to the kind of empirical state of bliss or experience of rebirth that a 
religion should offer]. […] These tendencies have not by themselves 
determined the psychological character of religion; they have, however, exerted 
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a very lasting influence upon it. (Weber, 1974c, p. 279)  
Every social stratum has a tendency towards a particular type of Weltbild and 
religious experience. Not only does this tendency not necessarily configure a 
bond, but it turns out to be founded more on the nature of the profession, on 
the physiognomy of the activity carried out and not on economic interests in 
the strict sense of the word. The element that for example inclines warriors or 
farmers, artisans or bureaucrats towards a certain world image cannot be for-
mulated in terms of economic interests and does not depend on the quantity of 
wellbeing or economic resources at their disposal. Rather it refers to the physi-
ognomy of a relationship with the world that is rooted in their social identity 
and unites subjects who, from the strictly economic point of view, possess in-
terests that may even be opposing. There is a tendency among castes, classes, 
social strata and particular characteristics of the religious world image that is 
rooted in the concrete physiognomy of the contribution that each group gives 
to social reproduction: a sort of ontological-social root to the world image.  
It is on this basis that for each of the great religious Weltbilder Weber iden-
tifies the social stratum that was its carrier, propagator and privileged repre-
sentative: 
If one wishes to characterize succinctly, in a formula so to speak, the types 
representative of the various strata that were the primary carriers or 
propagators of the so-called world religions, they would be the following: In 
Confucianism the world-organizing bureaucrat; in Hinduism the world-
ordering magician; in Buddhism, the mendicant monk wandering through the 
world; […] and in Christianity, the itinerant journeyman. To be sure, all these 
types must not be taken as exponents of their own occupational or material 
―class interests,‖ but rather as the ideological carriers of the kind of ethical or 
salvation doctrine which rather readily conformed to [sich besonders leicht 
vermählte] their social position. (Weber, 1978, p. 512). 
The crucial question that comes up at this point relates to identifying the ele-
ments that decide which social stratum manages to model ―in its own image‖ 
the world image that is then also shared by all or nevertheless some others. The 
implicit answer in Weber’s investigation of the world religions singles out the 
reasons for the success of a particular Weltbild as its capacity to appear more 
persuasive owing to something that individuals already believe, or more plausi-
ble owing to a certain experience of the world, or more suited to providing 
convincing answers to the challenges that a human group perceives. Hence, 
what essentially governs which basic features are selected for a world image are 
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the challenges and threats that an entire society perceives as incumbent. In 
addition to a world image being rooted in the inclination [Neigung] of a par-
ticular social stratum towards a certain type of religiosity, Weber insists that 
the success of a Weltbild depends on its suitability for the nature and physiog-
nomy of the challenges that the natural and social, economic and political con-
text is experiencing. The world image that best reflects the nature and dimen-
sions of the existential threat that a society is exposed to and the 
forces/resources needed to deal with it is the one that succeeds. 
The non-deterministic bond that links social identity and world image is 
also due, therefore, to the fact that in the end the image imposed upon the 
whole of society and all the strata is the one that is in close harmony with the 
social being of one particular stratum alone. ―Ready conformity‖ between a 
social position’s materiality and religious world image singles out the carriers 
and privileged representatives of a certain type of religiosity, but it is not the 
indispensable requirement for adopting a particular religious Weltbild. The 
various Weltbilder are also accepted/shared by those for whom there is no 
ready conformity between social position and religious world image. The ex-
pression ―readily conformed to‖ serves to single out the social strata that are 
the main supporters and propagators of a particular (religious) image of the 
world, but this image is also shared by other social strata (sometimes by all the 
other social strata) for whom there is no ready conformity. Not only does a cer-
tain social position simply incline towards a world image with which there is a 
ready conformity, but the image that a particular social stratum adopts is not 
necessarily the one that readily conforms to its material condition. 
In the face of conditioning by a plurality of material dimensions, Weltbilder 
possess an autonomy essentially linked to two factors. First of all, their greatly 
inertial nature: world images possess a duration that by far exceeds the material 
constellations that conditioned them, and that makes them an independent and 
significant factor conditioning both the material organisation of a society and 
the possible directions in which the same world image can be transformed. 
The autonomy of the world images with respect to their material condition-
ing is linked, in second place, to their possessing an autonomous evolutive 
capacity, to the existence of an autonomous legality that governs their ―lives‖ 
and that can produce significant changes – with significant effects on the ethi-
cal conduct of individuals – regardless of any conditioning of a material kind. 
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4. Weber’s World Image 
In Weber’s line of thought, the notion of Weltbild is conceptualised and ex-
plicitly applied in reference to the world religions only. Nevertheless, in my 
opinion it is possible to glimpse its application in a different context too: in 
Weber’s diagnosis of modernity. Or rather, the context in which he sets out the 
normative proposal that he puts forward on the basis of the transformations of 
modernity. 
In the two conferences (Science as a Vocation and Politics as a Vocation), 
the texts in which Weber’s take on his times becomes more explicit, it clearly 
emerges how his normative proposal on the conditions for giving a single 
meaning to life cannot be separated from the expression of his ―own‖ image of 
the world. It is in this particularly significant sense that the author who perhaps 
more than any other stressed the objectivity and non-valuation of scientific 
work is ―forced‖ to come face to face with undemonstrable assumptions as 
soon as he has to motivate a practical option, or to assess its burden on the sub-
ject. It will be helpful to outline the fundamental features of Weber’s Weltbild 
in order to highlight how world image is the inevitable reference for a practical 
stance towards the world even in «a godless and prophetless time», since sci-
ence is not able to respond in an objective — definitive and universal — manner 
to the question of what the world is, and, finally, since the answer to this ques-
tion is the fundamental variable that decides the (non-material) burden of a 
certain attitude towards the world.  
The first characteristic trait of Weber’s world image can be seen as his de-
nial of the existence of an objective meaning. For Weber meaning is subjective 
property: it is not a property of things, but a capacity of the subject. The world 
does not have a meaning, it does not express any normativity. This position 
implies first of all that he distances himself from any religious world image: 
The inward interest of a truly religiously ―musical‖ man can never be served by 
veiling to him and to others the fundamental fact that he is destined to live in a 
godless and prophetless time by giving him the surrogates [Ersatz] of armchair 
prophecy. (Weber, 1974b, p. 153)  
What is worth observing immediately is that it is not late modernity that is 
lacking a god and prophets, but Weber’s world image. From an empirical point 
of view because Weber’s contemporary times do not sociologically show gen-
eralised atheism, and from a theoretical viewpoint because modern science 
does not demonstrate atheism. As is well known, Weber defined himself relig-
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iously as unmüsicalisch, he did not believe that scientific development in any 
way demonstrated the unsustainability of religious faith, instead he believed 
that modern science ―enforced‖ a redefinition of the forms and nature of reli-
gious experience, that it pushed the perception of God to the sidelines, but in 
no way could the image of a world without God be demonstrated by means of 
science. There is no space for any truth in the blunt alternative between the 
religious and non-religious image of the world. 
Not just that: Weber’s times celebrated the splendour of two world images 
that defend the idea of an objective meaning of the world without being reli-
gious images. First of all, progress, as the secular surrogate for an objective 
religious meaning of the world.1 Second, Marxism and the communist proph-
ecy of the advent of the reign of freedom: 
Even as late as, 1906, a mere minority among a rather considerable number of 
proletarians gave as reason for their disbelief in Christianity conclusions 
derived from modern theories of natural sciences. The majority, however, 
referred to the ―injustice‖ of the order of this world – to be sure, essentially 
because they believe in a revolutionary compensation in this world. (Weber, 
1974c, pp. 275–276) 
The growing modern detachment was not exclusively the result of the effects of 
modern science and did not in any way imply the decline of faith in an objective 
meaning of the world. Religion, communist progress and a godless and 
prophetless world were co-present world images and the choice still remained 
a question of faith all the same. 
The place where the ―nominalistic‖ torsion and denial of an objective 
meaning of the world become more evident is in the second characteristic as-
pect of Weber’s world image.  
Every empirical consideration of this situation would, as the elder Mill 
remarked, lead to the acknowledgement of absolute polytheism as the only 
appropriate metaphysics. […] It is really a question not only of alternatives 
between values but of an irreconcilable death-struggle, like that between 
―God‖ and the ―Devil‖. (Weber, 2011, p. 17)  
 
1 «Der ―Fortschritts‖-Gedanke stellt sich eben erst dann als notwendig ein, wenn das Bedürfnis ent-
steht, dem religiös entleerten Ablauf des Menschheitsschicksals einen diesseitigen und dennoch ob-
jektiven ―Sinn‖ zu verleihen»; Weber, 1903, note 83. 
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There is explicit reference to classical polytheism and the rebirth of the ancient 
gods in Science as a Vocation. Equally as explicit – and repeated several times 
– is the distinction between polytheism and relativism. Nevertheless, it is pre-
cisely the reference to Greek classical antiquity that enables us to appreciate 
the differences and the effects on the subjectivity of reproposing polytheism 
outside a metaphysics that gives a statute of objectivity to the fight between life 
orders and values. 
The shallowness of our routinized daily existence in the most significant sense 
of the word consists indeed in the fact that the persons who are caught up in it 
do not become aware, and above all do not wish to become aware, of this partly 
psychologically, part pragmatically conditioned motley of irreconcilably 
antagonistic values. They avoid the choice between ―God‖ and the ―Devil‖ 
(Weber, 2011, p. 18). 
In a world image that does not attribute objectivity to polytheism, but embeds it 
in the overstepping of a certain threshold of intensity of meaning in the rela-
tionship with objects, the boundary between polytheism and relativism loses its 
inevitability. For the ancients it was inevitable to choose between Apollo and 
Aphrodite because their struggle was an inevitable, objective conflict. Modern 
man only has to experience conflict and need to choose after adopting a stance 
with regard to life that does not let it go by like a natural event: something that 
not only does not turn out to be inevitable, but, from the viewpoint of a com-
fortable life, even turns out to be preferable. The superficiality of everyday life 
indicates the absence of reflexivity, the lack of distance from life that corre-
sponds to the reign of routine and habit, to the domination of the obvious: 
something extraordinarily convenient that makes choosing the only demon to 
whom to entrust one’s life strings onerous and not inevitable. 
With the third aspect of Weber’s world image we start to come across some 
of the fundamental issues to which religious world images have also tried to 
provide an answer. It is the aspect of human action as destiny, the heterogene-
sis of the ends as the logic within worldly happenings: the matter of Puritan-
ism’s contribution to creating a bourgeois method of living «instructs us in the 
paradox of unintended consequences: i.e., the relation of man and fate, of what 
he intended by his acts [Absicht] and what actually came of them» (Weber, 
1968, p. 238). Human action in the world has to resign itself to the idea of the 
paradoxical nature of consequences with respect to intentions, of what is 
prompted by the action with respect to what the subject proposed as his aim. It 
is the paradoxical nature of the relationship between intentions and outcomes 
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that world images have tried to account for through the idea of providence and 
postulating an otherworldly level of compensation. 
Weber’s insistence on the ethical irrationalism of the world can be inter-
preted as a specific dimension of this aspect: namely, the denial of the idea that 
in the world «from good comes only good; but from evil only evil follows» 
(Weber, 1974a, p. 122). The world is not the place of congruence between 
destiny and merit, the place of coherence between the moral quality of the ac-
tion and the moral quality of the effects, but the realm of «undeserved suffer-
ing, unpunished injustice, and hopeless stupidity» (Weber, 1974a, p. 122). 
Weber’s indication with regard to the centrality of this aspect for the develop-
ment of all religions enables us to cast light on a crucial point: world images 
possess different capacities of meaning, a different explicative power. Where 
the religious image had pinpointed a problem to which it responded with faith 
in another world, in Weber’s world image this place is taken by the tragic en-
actment of the world’s ethical irrationality as a given without remedy. 
The last characteristic of Weber’s Weltbild is disenchantment, in the dual 
meaning of objectivising the laws on how the world works, but also of faith in 
the possibility of man obtaining knowledge and experience of the world. Dis-
enchantment does not mean more effective knowledge of the processes and 
conditions of life that surround us, but «[the] belief that if one but wished one 
could» and that «one can, in principle, master all things by calculation» (We-
ber, 1974b, p. 139). A disenchanted attitude towards the world is the trait of 
Weber’s Weltbild that is most directly affected by modern science, but it is 
nevertheless still a world image, something that goes beyond scientific knowl-
edge in the strict sense and is constituted as the horizon of expectations, as 
faith in the capacity of reason for which we can have arguments, but no proof. It 
is feeling at home in the world despite its objectivity: it is having faith without 
wonder.  
Nevertheless, the world image alone is not the only thing that defines the 
individual’s condition in late modernity and dictates the outlines of Weber’s 
proposal on how it is still possible to give a meaning to life as a whole. An inte-
gral part of the problem is also Weber’s analysis of the material processes that 
define late capitalistic modernity. It is a complex diagnosis that nevertheless 
can be described with three theses: the transformation of the economic cosmos 
into an iron cage (capitalism as the most deadly of the powers of our times); the 
incumbent threat of bureaucratic petrification (the cage of future servitude); 
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and finally material satiety owing to the overabundant availability of consumer 
goods. 
In this material scenario, Weber’s fundamental question is this: on what 
conditions is a conduct possible that can provide answers to the question on 
the meaning of life? The general lines of Weber’s answer are clear: on condi-
tion that a bond can be reactivated between individual action and ethical pow-
ers. It is here that the centrality of the relationship between politics and ethics 
is rooted. If there has to be a relationship, the concrete physiognomy that We-
ber tends to give to this relationship is decided on the basis not just of the eco-
nomic and material conditions in the broad sense of late capitalism, not just on 
precise institutional conditions, but also on the resources and the horizons of 
meaning made available by a particular Weltbild with their capacity to establish 
the global burden of a particular practical conduct.  
The exposure of Weber’s world image therefore provides the background 
that holds up the normative line of argument concerning the particular inflec-
tion that ethics can take on in politics. Hence, political action is guaranteed its 
resources of meaning. The solution that Weber proposes is for the ethics of 
responsibility and the ethics of intention to complete each other: an indication 
taking note that — in a world full of goods, by now the only world available — an 
ethics that radically rejects the world is unlikely to be feasible. Beware: We-
ber’s discourse and his world image cannot demonstrate that, in particular in 
politics, the choice to follow the ethics of intention is ethically indefensible. He 
can only provide arguments to support his position and to this end he does not 
disdain from using strained, polemical interpretations that demand a coherent 
performance from the interlocutor who is hypothetically in favour of an ethics 
of intention. However, at the close of the lecture, Weber himself admits he is 
unable to provide one. 
Indeed, it is not exactly a logically coherent and linear solution to toughen 
the excessively compromissorial tendency of the ethics of responsibility with 
the intransigency of ethics of intention. Nevertheless, it does respond to two 
diverging requirements of Weber’s world image and his analysis of the present: 
the difficulty to radically reject the world once the world has become the only 
available horizon, but also the awareness of the world’s ethical irrationality and 
the need to remain unwilling to totally adapt to its logic. 
Translated from the Italian by Karen Whittle 
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